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Abstract
Watermarking has shown its effectiveness in protecting the
intellectual property of Deep Neural Networks (DNNs). Ex-
isting techniques usually embed a set of carefully-crafted
sample-label pairs into the target model during the training
process. Then ownership verification is performed by query-
ing a suspicious model with those watermark samples and
checking the prediction results. These watermarking solu-
tions claim to be robustness against model transformations,
which is challenged by this paper. We design a novel wa-
termark removal attack, which can defeat state-of-the-art so-
lutions without any prior knowledge of the adopted water-
marking technique and training samples. We make two con-
tributions in the design of this attack. First, we propose a
novel preprocessing function, which embeds imperceptible
patterns and performs spatial-level transformations over the
input. This function can make the watermark sample unrec-
ognizable by the watermarked model, while still maintaining
the correct prediction results of normal samples. Second, we
introduce a fine-tuning strategy using unlabelled and out-of-
distribution samples, which can improve the model usability
in an efficient manner. Extensive experimental results indi-
cate that our proposed attack can effectively bypass existing
watermarking solutions with very high success rates.
Introduction
Deep learning (DL) has achieved tremendous success and
outperformed traditional machine learning models in vari-
ous tasks and applications. Production-level DL models are
usually trained from private and valuable datasets with a
large amount of computing resources to reach state-of-the-
art performance. As a result, they become important Intel-
lectual Property (IP) for AI companies and practitioners.
However, release of these models (even as black-boxes) suf-
fers from the risks of illegitimate model stolen, reproduction
or distribution, which can cause copyright infringement and
significant economic loss to the model owners.
An efficient way for IP protection is watermarking. Orig-
inally designed for digital media (Boneh and Shaw 1995;
Petitcolas, Anderson, and Kuhn 1999), this concept has
been recently applied to the protection of DL models. This
technique enables the ownership verification of DL mod-
els by embedding watermarks into the Deep Neural Net-
works (DNNs). Then the owners can extract the water-
marks from suspicious models as the evidence of ownership.
One straightforward strategy is to embed specially-designed
vectors into certain model parameters (Uchida et al. 2017;
Rouhani, Chen, and Koushanfar 2019). These methods re-
quire the owner to have white-box accesses to the model
parameters during the watermark extraction phase. Besides,
the verification key can only be used once. These signifi-
cantly limit the possible applications and usage scenarios.
A more promising approach is data-poisoning watermark-
ing (Zhang et al. 2018; Adi et al. 2018; Fan, Ng, and Chan
2019), which modifies the model to give pre-defined out-
put on some carefully-crafted watermark samples. Then
the owners with only black-box accesses to the suspicious
model can extract such watermarks by querying the model.
Specifically, during the watermark embedding phase, the
model owner designs a set of unique sample-label pairs as
watermarks, which will never be recognized by other mod-
els. Then the owner trains the model to memorize the cor-
relation between the watermark samples and labels. These
samples must be carefully designed not to impact the perfor-
mance of the model on normal samples. Typical techniques
select imperceptible perturbations, backdoor samples or out-
of-distribution samples for watermark embedding. During
the watermark extraction phase, the owner sends these sam-
ples to the suspicious model and checks whether the pre-
dicted results match the verification labels.
A good watermarking mechanism must satisfy two re-
quirements. The first one is functionality-preserving: the em-
bedded watermarks should not affect the performance of the
target model on normal samples. The second one is robust-
ness, where the watermarks cannot be removed with com-
mon model transformation, e.g., fine-tuning, model com-
pression, etc. Even the adversary knows the target model is
watermarked, he has no means to remove the watermarks
if he does not know the details of watermark samples. Al-
though the robustness of existing data-poisoning watermark-
ing approaches has been empirically evaluated, there still ex-
ists a gap between the practical implementation and formal
proof. So we raise this question: is it possible for an adver-
sary to remove the watermarks from the model and invali-
date the adopted watermarking scheme, while still preserv-
ing the model’s functionality?
Past works attempted to design watermark removal at-
tacks to answer this question. However, they suffer from
some limitations. For instance, fine-tuning was used to re-
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move the watermarks from the model (Chen et al. 2019;
Shafieinejad et al. 2019). Since existing watermarking so-
lutions are robust against common fine-tuning transforma-
tions, original training samples need to be included to fine-
tune the model in order to remove the watermarks com-
pletely. Thus these solutions assume the adversary has the
knowledge of original training dataset, which is unrealis-
tic in certain scenarios. An alternative direction is to adopt
the strategies of backdoor mitigation to remove watermarks
(Namba and Sakuma 2019; Aiken, Kim, and Woo 2020).
Unfortunately, these solutions fail to defeat backdoor attacks
(as well as watermarks) with complex patterns (Liu et al.
2019a; Tan and Shokri 2019). They are not applicable to wa-
termark schemes based on other techniques (e.g., adversarial
examples, out-of-distribution samples) either.
In this paper, we propose a more efficient and comprehen-
sive attack, which can defeat all existing data-poisoning wa-
termarking solutions without any prior knowledge of the em-
bedded techniques, watermark samples or training datasets.
Our attack has two innovations. The first one is a novel in-
put preprocessing function PST, which can remove the crit-
ical triggers or perturbations from the watermark samples
and alter the verification results. PST consists of a series of
transformations (embedding random imperceptible patterns,
spatial-level transformations) to invalidate watermark sam-
ples using any existing technique. The second contribution is
a model fine-tuning strategy with unlabelled data. Different
from prior works which rely on the fine-tuning to remove
watermarks, this step is just to improve the model perfor-
mance over normal samples, which is affected by the intro-
duced PST function. Hence, our fine-tuning requires fewer
epochs to reach high model performance. It does not need
the original training samples: a set of unlabelled and out-of-
distribution samples can be used to meet the goal as well.
We conducted extensive experiments to demonstrate the
effectiveness of our proposed attack. Experimental results
show that PST is more effective than existing preprocess-
ing techniques such as the ones used to counter adversarial
examples. Besides, our attack can remove all existing state-
of-the-art watermarks with very high success rates as well as
preserve the model’s usability.
Our main contributions are summarized as follows:
• A novel watermark removal attack, which can invalidate
all existing watermarking solutions without the knowl-
edge of watermarking techniques and training samples.
• A new input preprocessing function, which can alter the
desired results of watermark samples by embedding im-
perceptible patterns and spatial-level transformations.
• A model fine-tuning strategy with unlabelled and out-of-
distortion samples to improve the model’s usability.
• Comprehensive empirical evaluations to illustrate the ef-
fectiveness of the proposed attack against all existing
state-of-the-art watermarking methodologies.
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Figure 1: Workflow of data-poisoning watermarking.
Problem Statement
Data-poisoning Watermarking
We formally define the DNN watermarking scheme based
on data poisoning, and illustrate the necessary properties.
Definition 1. A DNN watermarking scheme with data poi-
soning is a tuple of probabilistic polynomial time algorithms
(WMGen, Mark, Verify), where
• WMGen generates a set of watermarks W =
{(xi, yi)}ni=1, in which xi is a secret watermark input and
yi is the corresponding verification label.
• Mark embeds the watermarks into a DL model f and out-
puts the watermarked model f̂ such that f̂(xi) = yi for
∀(xi, yi) ∈W .
• Verify sends {xi}ni=1 to a DL model f˜ and obtains the
predictions {yf˜ ,i}ni=1. If the probability that yf˜ ,i equals
yi for i ∈ [1, n] is larger than a predefined value τ , Verify
outputs 1. Otherwise it outputs 0.
Figure 1 illustrates the usage scenario of data-poisoning
watermarking schemes. A model owner embeds the water-
marks W into a DL model f during the training process and
then releases the watermarked model f̂ . Later he wants to
verify if a remote model f˜ is an illegitimate copy of f̂ . Since
the owner has only black-box accesses to this model, he can
query f˜ with the watermark samples {xi}ni=1 and collects
the predictions {yf˜ ,i}ni=1 via the public API. If the similarity
between {yi}ni=1 and {yf˜ ,i}ni=1 is higher than τ , the owner
can claim the ownership of this tested model.
Let Pf̂ ,D be the prediction accuracy of f̂ on the normal
samples following the training data distribution D; Pf̂ ,W be
the accuracy of f̂ on the verification watermarks W , i.e.,
Pf̂ ,D = Pr(f̂(x) == f(x), x v D), (1)
Pf̂ ,W = Pr(f̂(xi) == yi, i ∈ [1, n]). (2)
A data-poisoning watermarking scheme should have the
following basic properties (Adi et al. 2018; Zhang et al.
2018). (1) Functionality-preserving: Pf̂ ,D should be iden-
tical with Pf,D. (2) Robustness: Verify outputs 1 even if f̂
is slightly transformed to a different model f˜ using com-
mon techniques such as fine-tune or model compression, i.e.
Pf˜ ,W > τ .
Various state-of-the-art data-poisoning techniques have
been proposed to embed watermarks into DNN models.
These methods can be generally classified into three cate-
gories, as described below:
Perturbation-based : the samples are generated by slightly
perturbing normal samples, where the difference between
the two types of samples is bounded. The samples can be
generated using the adversarial frontier stitching (Le Mer-
rer, Perez, and Tre´dan 2019) or GAN-based techniques (Li
et al. 2019).
Pattern-based : the samples are generated by embedding
a certain pattern into normal images using backdoor tech-
niques (Adi et al. 2018; Zhang et al. 2018).
Out-of-distribution (OOD) : the samples are randomly se-
lected from the internet and totally different from the normal
ones (Adi et al. 2018).
Watermark Removal Attacks
The robustness of the existing watermarking solutions is
challenged, where researchers are focusing on the design of
attacks to remove the embedded watermarks from the tar-
get model. An adversary aims to transform the watermarked
model f̂ into a different one f˜ , which can break the prop-
erty of Equation (1) but still maintain the property of Equa-
tion (2). We consider a threat model where the adversary has
white-box accesses to the target model, and is able to alter
the model in an arbitrary way. A good removal attack must
meet the following requirements:
• Comprehensive: the attack should be able to invali-
date all these existing watermarking solutions, including
perturbation-based, pattern-based and OOD.
• Training-agnostic: the adversary has no knowledge about
the employed watermarking scheme. He does not know
which technique is used and what type of watermark sam-
ples is. He does not have access to the original train-
ing samples either. Instead, he can use unlabeled in-
distribution or out-of-distribution samples for the attacks.
• Efficient: the adversary should be able to remove the wa-
termarks in a lightweight manner, i.e., with much less
computation cost than training a model from scratch. Oth-
erwise, he will lose the motivation of stealing the target
model, and just train his own copy.
However, existing watermark removal attacks fail to
satisfy all these requirements. Specifically, (Namba and
Sakuma 2019; Aiken, Kim, and Woo 2020) assume the wa-
termark samples are pattern-based that can be detected and
removed using existing pattern detection techniques. They
also require the access to the entire training dataset. Al-
though (Chen et al. 2019) proposed a comprehensive attack,
it requires to access a large mount of labeled samples, as
well as original training set. These limitations motivate us
to design a more powerful and efficient watermark removal
attack, as described below.
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Figure 2: Overview of the proposed attack.
Proposed Attack
In this section, we present our novel watermark removal at-
tack, which transforms a watermarked model to invalidate
all existing watermarking solutions without any knowledge
of the adopted embedding technique. Our attack is com-
posed of two components. First, we introduce a novel pre-
processing function, Pattern embedding and Spatial-level
Transformation (PST), to remove the effects of potential
watermark perturbations or patterns. Second, we adopt the
fine-tuning with unlabeled data to further reduce the nega-
tive impacts on normal samples caused by PST.
Figure 2 illustrates the workflow of our proposed attack.
The adversary is given a watermarked model f̂ and a set
of unlabeled samples, which do not necessarily follow the
same distribution as the original training set. During the of-
fline phase, he first adopts PST to transform the samples.
Then, he utilizes the model f̂ as an oracle to identify the pre-
dicted labels of the transformed samples. With such sample-
label pairs, the adversary fine-tunes f̂ for a small number of
epochs to reach similar performance as f̂ . During the on-
line phase, each inference sample xi will be preprocessed
by PST, and then sent to the fine-tuned model f̂ for predic-
tion. For the verification sample, this inference process can
give an output different from the verification label. Below
we describe the details of each component.
Input Preprocessing with PST
A data-poisoning watermarked model is trained to memo-
rize the relationships between {xi}ni=1 and {yi}ni=1. During
the verification, the watermarked model will predict yi given
xi. However, we observe that such memory can be broken
by spatial-level transformations. Based on this, we aim to
design a new transformation PST to preprocess watermark
samples, and make them unrecognizable by f̂ . This transfor-
mation should also preserve the performance of f̂ on normal
samples as much as possible.
Our PST function consists of three modules: (1) scaling
is to resize an input sample to a fixed size; (2) impercepti-
ble pattern embedding introduces human-unnoticeable per-
turbations to reduce the impact of abnormal pixels and pat-
terns in the watermark samples; (3) spatial-level transfor-
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Figure 3: An example of PST. The grid is the imperceptible
pattern which will be embedded into the scaled sample.
mations further destroy the special spatial shapes introduced
by the watermarking scheme, especially for watermark sam-
ples with large patterns. Detailed steps are illustrated below.
Step 1: Scaling. Given a sample x of an arbitrary size,
PST first scales it to a fixed size. Specifically, PST chooses
the bicubic interpolation (Meijering 2002) for scaling to re-
duce the correlation between watermark samples and labels.
This operation Bicubic interpolates pixels by considering
a small square neighborhood (4×4 in our experiments):
x = Bicubic(x, β),
where β is the scaling paramater. We choose this bicubic in-
terpolation for two reasons. First, it decreases the values of
singular pixels and makes the samples smoother, which can
reduce the impact of watermark samples to f̂ . Second, sam-
ples with bicubic interpolation have fewer interpolation arti-
facts and often outperform the ones with bilinear or nearest-
neighbor interpolation. Thus, this step can better preserve
the performance of f̂ on normal samples.
Step 2: Imperceptible Pattern Embedding. Besides the
bicubic interpolation, PST embeds random imperceptible
patterns into the scaled watermark samples to further affect
the prediction of f̂ . Due to the imperceptibility property, the
embedded pattern will not impact the performance of f̂ over
normal samples. Since the adversary has no prior knowledge
about the watermarking scheme and watermark samples, we
design a random yet easily identifiable pattern to alter the
memory of f̂ about the watermark samples.
In particular, we adopt a random grid median filter
MedianFilter to generate the desired imperceptible pat-
tern. During the embedding, PST first selects a set of ran-
dom rows and columns with the same interval size v. For
each pixel xi,j in the selected rows and columns, it is re-
placed by the pixel with the median value in the neighbor-
hood. The pattern size is controlled by the interval size v: a
large v can lead to a small number of the selected columns
and rows, and a more imperceptible pattern. This median
filter can be replaced by other types of filters such as the
maximum filter.
Step 3: Spatial-level Transformations. Although the
above pixel-level transformations can affect the watermark
samples with small perturbations, they are insufficient to re-
move large perturbations such as pattern-based watermarks.
To this end, we propose to adopt spatial-level transforma-
tions to further compromise the effects of watermark sam-
ples. We integrate two different transformations and use a
parameter γ to uniformly control the strength of each one.
Specifically, Let (i, j) be a pixel of x and (˜i, j˜) be the corre-
sponding transformed pixel. For each operation, we require
the distance between each dimension of the input and output
pixels to be lower than γ, i.e.,
|i− i˜| ≤ γ, and |j − j˜| ≤ γ.
Our PST first adopts random affine transformations
(Affine) over the pattern-embedded x. An affine transfor-
mation is linear and can be formalized as a 2 × 3 matrix,
which preserves points, straight lines, and planes of samples.
For a pixel (i, j), it calculates[
i˜
j˜
]
=
[
a11 a12 b1
a21 a22 b2
][i
j
1
]
. (3)
For example, the matrix of the translation transformation
in the horizontal direction is
[
1 0 φ
0 1 0
]
. To meet the dis-
tance constraint, we randomly choose φ such that |φ| ≤ γ
for all the columns. We can combine multiple affine trans-
formations together such as rotation and translation.
Besides affine transformations, we also adopt an elastic
transformation Elastic to further modify the samples. It
is a nonlinear transformation that produces random elastic
distortions. It first generates random displacement fields that
are convolved with a Gaussian distribution of standard de-
viation σ. The displacement fields are then multiplied by a
scaling factor α that controls the intensity of the deforma-
tion. This transformation is mainly controlled by two param-
eters: the standard deviation σ and the scaling factor α. We
adjust these two parameters to restrict the displacement to
be smaller than γ.
The PST operation gpst is presented in Algorithm 1
(Lines 8-16). Figure 3 demonstrates an example of PST
on a watermark sample. Specifically, gpst first scales the
given sample x with Bicubic (Figure 3 (1)). Then, it ran-
domly selects rows and columns with the same interval and
uses MedianFilter to generate the imperceptible pattern
(Figure 3 (2)). It further adopts Affine and Elastic on
x to produce spatial-level distortions (Figure 3 (3)-(4)). Fi-
nally, it rescales the transformed sample to the original size.
Fine-tuning with Unlabeled Data
Although the above PST operation gpst can make the wa-
termarked model forget the watermark samples and labels,
it can affect the model accuracy on normal samples as well.
Here, we propose to fine-tune f̂ to enhance the model perfor-
mance. Different from the fine-tuning-only solution (Chen
et al. 2019) which requires the labeled training samples, our
method can select an arbitrary set of data samples, which
even do not need to be labeled or follow the same distribu-
tion as the original training set.
As illustrated in Algorithm 1 (Lines 17-21), this fine-
tuning process consists of two steps. First, given a set of
Algorithm 1: Ownership verification under our attack
technique.
Parameters: β, v, γ, f̂ , {x′i}, {xi, yi}ni=1
1 Function Verify({xi, yi}ni=1):
2 foreach xi ∈ {xi}ni=1 do
3 y˜i ← f˜(gpst(xi)), where f˜ ← Fine-tune;
4 if d({yi}ni=1, {y˜i}ni=1) < τ then
5 return 1
6 else
7 return 0
8 Function gpst(x):
9 x← Bicubic(x, β);
10 Randomly selected rows and columns with interval
v;
11 foreach xi,j in the selected rows and columns do
12 xi,j ← MedianFilter(xi,j);
13 x← Affine(x, γ);
14 x← Elastic(x, γ);
15 x˜← Bicubic(x, 1β );
16 return x˜
17 Function Fine-tune(f̂ , {x′i}):
18 foreach x′i ∈ {x′i} do
19 y′i ← f̂(gpst(x′i));
20 f˜ ← Train(f̂ , {gpst(x′i), y′i});
21 return f˜
unlabeled samples {x′i}, we calculate the corresponding la-
bel of each sample using f̂ as a oracle. Second, we establish
a dataset {(gpst(x′i), f̂(gpst(x′i)))} and fine-tune the model
f̂ using this dataset for a few epochs to reach the desired
performance. This fine-tuning process takes very short time
to complete, and can effectively adjust the noise and pertur-
bations introduced by PST.
The owner executes Algorithm 1 (Lines 1-7) to identify
the ownership of the fine-tuned model. For each watermark
sample xi, the adversary returns y˜i = f˜(gpst(xi)). Due to
the effectiveness of gpst and f˜ , y˜i is different from yi with a
high probability. Thus, the similarity between {yi}ni=1 and{y˜i}ni=1 would be smaller than τ , which can prevent the
model owner from identifying the watermarks. In contrast,
for normal samples x, f˜ will give the correct results.
Experiments
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our attack on
existing state-of-the-art wateramrking schemes.
Experimental Setup
Datasets and DNN models. We conduct experiments on the
CIFAR10 and CIFAR100 datasets that have the same num-
ber of training samples. CIFAR10 has 10 classes of samples,
and CIFAR-100 has 100 classes. We evaluate our attack on a
ResNet model (He et al. 2016) for image classification. We
Figure 4: Examples of the watermark samples in our exper-
iments. First row: normal sample and the four types of wa-
termark samples; Second row: the samples that are prepro-
cessed using PST with γ = 10; Third row: the samples that
are preprocessed using PST with γ = 20.
adopt a batch size of 100 and a fading learning rate with an
value of 0.1.
Watermark Samples. We evaluate our attack on four types
of state-of-the-art watermark samples:
• Perturbation: the watermark samples are generated by
adding imperceptible perturbations on normal samples.
Then they will be close to the frontiers of the models
(Le Merrer, Perez, and Tre´dan 2019).
• Patch: the watermark samples are created by embedding a
specific patch into the normal samples (Zhang et al. 2018).
• Content: the watermark samples are generated by embed-
ding the word “TEXT” into the normal samples (Zhang
et al. 2018).
• OOD: the watermark samples are randomly selected from
unrelated datasets (Adi et al. 2018).
Figure 4 (first row) illustrates an example of a normal sam-
ple and the corresponding four types of watermark samples.
Following the implementation in (Adi et al. 2018; Le Merrer,
Perez, and Tre´dan 2019), we set the number of watermark
samples as 100. We set τ as 60% for both CIFAR10 and
CIFAR100 when perturbation-based watermark samples are
involved. Otherwise, τ is 20% for CIFAR10 and 10% for
CIFAR100. We train models from scratch to embed the wa-
termarks. Each training process is stopped after 60 epochs if
the model accuracy on watermark samples is 1. Otherwise,
we continue the training till all watermarks are embedded.
Implementation Details. For PST, we set β as 5 and the
size of the scaled images is 160×160. We set the inter-
val size as 5 to generate the imperceptible pattern. We set
the displacement bound γ in spatial-level transformations as
15. We use both in-distribution and out-of-distribution un-
labeled samples in the fine-tuning phase. Specifically, the
in-distribution samples are generated from the correspond-
ing datasets using data augmentation techniques. The out-of-
distribution samples of CIFAR10 (resp. CIFAR100) are ran-
domly selected from CIFAR100 (resp. CIFAR10). We use
25000 unlabeled samples in this phase and fine-tune the wa-
termarked models for 20 epochs.
Effectiveness of Our Attack
We consider two strategies: the first one is to just use in-
put preprocessing to remove watermarks. The attacker can
choose PST transformation, or PST without imperceptible
pattern embedding (denoted as ST). For comparisons, we
also implement some state-of-the-art transformations for ad-
versarial example mitigation as baselines: BdR (Xu, Evans,
and Qi 2017), Shield (Das et al. 2018), PD (Prakash et al.
2018), FD (Liu et al. 2019b), and GB (Hendrycks and Diet-
terich 2019). Since they are proposed to remove small per-
turbations in adversarial examples, we adjust the parameters
of these methods to affect samples with large patterns till
their accuracy is lower than 70% (resp. 40%) on CIFAR10
(resp. CIFAR100).
The second strategy is the end-to-end attack with both
PST and fine-tuning. We compare it with the black-box wa-
termark removal attack (FT) in (Shafieinejad et al. 2019)
which only fine-tunes the watermarked models with unla-
beled samples. FT takes a set of unlabeled samples as in-
put and obtains their labels using the watermarked model as
an oracle. Then, it fine-tunes the watermarked models for
20 epochs with the new sample-label pairs. To be compre-
hensive, we implement the two solutions with in-distribution
data for fine-tuning as well (Proposed-In and FT-In).
Since these input transformation functions introduce high
randomization, we run each experiment five times to obtain
the statistical results. We calculate the average performance
of the attacks on normal samples PD to reflect their usabil-
ity. We select the minimum accuracy of the attacks on wa-
termark samples PW to quantify their effectiveness.
The experimental results are illustrated in Table 1. For the
first strategy, we observe that perturbation and OOD water-
marks are vulnerable to all kinds of transformations. The
adversarial example transformations (except FD) and PST
(also ST) can easily remove these two types of watermarks
on both CIFAR10 and CIFAR100. However, adversarial ex-
ample transformations are not helpful in removing pattern-
based watermarks. Although GB can remove Content wa-
termarks on CIFAR100, all adversarial example transforma-
tions can not affect Patch watermarks even PD is extremely
low. In contrast, PST can significantly reduce the accuracy
of the watermarked model on all types of watermarks with-
out heavily affecting PD. ST is slightly worse than PST, but
is still much better than the other transformations.
For the second strategy, we observe that although FT-In
and FT-Out have almost the same performance on normal
samples, they cannot remove watermarks, which was con-
firmed by the results in existing watermarking papers (Adi
et al. 2018; Zhang et al. 2018). Our attack (Proposed-In and
Proposed-Out) can remove all watermarks and preserve ac-
ceptable PD values. Besides, the proposed fine-tuning pro-
cess can not only improve the performance of the models on
normal samples, but also further cleanse the watermarks.
Figure 5 illustrates the success rates of our attack. We ob-
serve that both Proposed-In and Proposed-Out can remove
all types of watermarks with very high chances. For CI-
Datasets Attack Perturbation Patch Content OOD
PD PW PD PW PD PW PD PW
CIFAR10
None 0.92 1.00 0.92 1.00 0.92 1.00 0.92 1.00
BdR 0.45 0.36 0.47 1.00 0.46 0.87 0.47 0.11
Shield 0.67 0.34 0.63 1.00 0.64 0.88 0.66 0.11
PD 0.52 0.56 0.49 0.99 0.55 0.52 0.53 0.15
FD 0.57 0.61 0.58 1.00 0.56 0.70 0.55 0.15
GB 0.54 0.49 0.56 1.00 0.63 0.33 0.66 0.16
ST 0.83 0.53 0.82 0.34 0.83 0.27 0.83 0.17
PST 0.83 0.58 0.82 0.32 0.82 0.24 0.83 0.14
FT-In 0.93 1.00 0.92 1.00 0.92 1.00 0.93 0.97
FT-Out 0.91 0.99 0.90 1.00 0.90 1.00 0.91 0.94
Proposed-In 0.90 0.44 0.89 0.13 0.89 0.17 0.90 0.11
Proposed-Out 0.87 0.53 0.87 0.15 0.86 0.15 0.87 0.07
CIFAR100
None 0.74 1.00 0.74 1.00 0.74 1.00 0.73 1.00
BdR 0.16 0.05 0.16 0.53 0.16 0.28 0.15 0.00
Shield 0.30 0.15 0.30 0.94 0.29 0.26 0.32 0.02
PD 0.25 0.40 0.24 0.71 0.25 0.12 0.23 0.04
FD 0.33 0.20 0.32 0.90 0.32 0.22 0.32 0.03
GB 0.39 0.15 0.40 0.82 0.43 0.01 0.43 0.02
ST 0.60 0.32 0.60 0.37 0.61 0.14 0.60 0.03
PST 0.60 0.28 0.60 0.30 0.61 0.11 0.60 0.02
FT-In 0.75 1.00 0.75 1.00 0.75 1.00 0.74 1.00
FT-Out 0.72 0.98 0.71 1.00 0.72 1.00 0.72 0.99
Proposed-In 0.69 0.17 0.69 0.09 0.69 0.05 0.69 0.02
Proposed-Out 0.63 0.15 0.63 0.08 0.64 0.04 0.63 0.01
Table 1: Experimental results of watermark removal attacks
on normal samples and watermark samples.
 0
 0.5
 1
Perturbation Patch Content OOD
Su
cc
es
s 
Ra
tio
Proposed-In
Proposed-Out
(a) CIFAR10
 0
 0.5
 1
Perturbation Patch Content OOD
Su
cc
es
s 
Ra
tio
Proposed-In
Proposed-Out
(b) CIFAR100
Figure 5: Success rates of our attack on the four types of
watermarking schemes.
FAR10, our attack has high success rates except Proposed-
Out on the Perturbation watermarks, which is caused by the
usage of adversarial frontiers and out-of-distribution sam-
ples. For CIFAR100, our attack can completely remove Per-
turbation, Content, and OOD watermarks. Its performance
on Patch watermarks is also satisfactory.
Impact of Parameters
Varying the number of unlabeled samples. We evaluate
the performance of our attack with different numbers of un-
labeled samples on CIFAR10. Figure 6 shows the perfor-
mance of our attack on Patch watermarks. We observe that
as the number of unlabeled samples increases, the model ac-
curacy of both Proposed-In and Proposed-Out slightly in-
creases as well. Thus, if the adversary has enough unlabeled
samples, he can obtain a high-quality model with the same
performance as the watermarked one. Beside, the success
rates of our attack are preserved and even slightly increases
with more unlabeled samples, which indicates its severe and
practical threat to existing watermarking schemes.
Varying γ. Figure 4 visually illustrates the transformed out-
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Figure 6: Performance of our attack with different numbers
of unlabeled in-distribution and out-of-distribution samples.
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Figure 7: Performance of Proposed-Out with different γ val-
ues on CIFAR100.
put of normal and watermark samples with γ = 10 (sec-
ond row) and γ = 20 (third row). Two observations are
made from this figure. First, the distortion caused by PST
increases as the displacement bound γ increases. Second,
the samples are randomly preprocessed, which indicates that
our attack can be adopted for various watermarking schemes
with different settings. We also measure the performance of
our attack with different γ values on CIFAR100. The experi-
mental results are presented in Figure 7. We observe that due
to the effect of the distortion, the model accuracy decreases
and the success rate (except Patch) increase on the four types
of watermarks with an increased γ.
Related Work
Watermarking for DNNs
Existing watermarking schemes for DNNs can be classi-
fied into two categories. The first category is parameter-
embedding watermarking. Motivated by traditional digi-
tal watermarking techniques, these solutions embed water-
marks into the parameters without decreasing the model’s
performance. For example, (Uchida et al. 2017) embeded a
bit-vector as the watermark into model parameters by adopt-
ing a parameter regularizer, which guarantees the success
of embedding as well as the accuracy of the watermarked
model. Instead of injecting watermarks into model param-
eters directly, (Rouhani, Chen, and Koushanfar 2019) im-
planted watermarks in the probability density function of the
activation sets of the DNN layers, which would not affect the
static properties of model parameters, such as the histogram.
The second category is data-poisoning watermarking.
These solutions take a set of carefully crafted sample-label
pairs as watermarks and embeds their correlation into DL
models during the training process. To preserve the func-
tionality and robustness of the watermarked models, the es-
sential component of data-poisoning watermarking schemes
is the generation of watermark samples. For examples,
(Le Merrer, Perez, and Tre´dan 2019) adopted adversarial ex-
amples near the frontiers as watermarks to identify the own-
ership of DL models. (Zhang et al. 2018; Adi et al. 2018)
employed techniques of backdoor attacks, and embedded
backdoor samples (Li et al. 2020) with certain trigger pat-
terns into DL models. However, perturbation and pattern
based watermark samples can be detected by adversaries.
Motivated by such limitation, (Namba and Sakuma 2019)
and (Li et al. 2019) generated watermark samples that are
almost indistinguishable from normal samples to avoid de-
tection by adversaries.
Watermark Removal
DNN watermarks can be vulnerable to removal attacks,
which try to invalidate the verification process without be-
ing noticed. Several techniques have been proposed to re-
move data-poisoning based watermarks, which mainly rely
on fine-tune and pattern detection. For example, (Chen et al.
2019) proposed REFIT to remove watermarks by fine-tuning
the watermarked DL models using a carefully-designed
learning rate schedule. Specifically, REFIT uses labeled
samples to fine-tune the models with elastic weight consol-
idation. To decrease the number of required in-distribution
labeled samples, REFIT further uses unlabeled samples to
preserve the performance. (Shafieinejad et al. 2019) pro-
posed black-box and white-box fine-tune attacks to remove
watermarks without access to the labeled samples or the wa-
termarks. However, as shown in our experiments, these fine-
tune techniques are not efficient and cannot remove data-
poisoning based watermarks with unlabeled samples.
(Namba and Sakuma 2019; Aiken, Kim, and Woo 2020)
observed that the watermark samples are different from nor-
mal ones, thus allowing an attacker to distinguish them dur-
ing verification. In particular, (Namba and Sakuma 2019)
detected watermark samples by tracking the statistical dif-
ference between watermark and normal samples. If the wa-
termark samples are detected, the attacker can modify both
the samples and the watermarked model to manipulate the
verification. (Aiken, Kim, and Woo 2020) detected and re-
covered pattern-based watermark samples using existing
backdoor recovery techniques and removed the watermarks
via fine-tuning. However, as emphasized in the above sec-
tions, this type of watermark removal attacks is not training-
agnostic and only works for specific watermarking schemes.
Conclusion
In this paper, we propose an efficient and practical attack to
blindly remove watermarks in DL models. We first design
a preprocessing function PST to invalidate the effects of
watermark perturbations and patterns. PST embeds imper-
ceptible patterns into samples and then modifies them using
spatial-level transformations. We fine-tune the watermarked
model with unlabeled samples to further increase the model
usability on normal samples. We conduct extensive experi-
ments to demonstrate that the proposed attack technique can
remove various types of state-of-the-art watermarks without
any prior knowledge about the watermarking schemes and
labeled training samples.
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